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Abstract
The precise nature and etiopathogenesis of borderline personality disorder (BPD) continues to elude researchers and
clinicians. Yet, increasing evidence from various strands of research converges to suggest that affect dysregulation,
impulsivity, and unstable relationships constitute the core features of BPD. Over the last two decades, the mentalization-
based approach to BPD has attempted to provide a theoretically consistent way of conceptualizing the interrelationship
between these core features of BPD, with the aim of providing clinicians with a conceptually sound and empirically
supported approach to BPD and its treatment. This paper presents an extended version of this approach to BPD based
on recently accumulated data. In particular, we suggest that the core features of BPD reflect impairments in different facets
of mentalization, each related to impairments in relatively distinct neural circuits underlying these facets. Hence, we
provide a comprehensive account of BPD by showing how its core features are related to each other in theoretically
meaningful ways. More specifically, we argue that BPD is primarily associated with a low threshold for the activation of
the attachment system and deactivation of controlled mentalization, linked to impairments in the ability to differentiate
mental states of self and other, which lead to hypersensitivity and increased susceptibility to contagion by other people’s
mental states, and poor integration of cognitive and affective aspects of mentalization. The combination of these
impairments may explain BPD patients’ propensity for vicious interpersonal cycles, and their high levels of affect
dysregulation and impulsivity. Finally, the implications of this expanded mentalization-based approach to BPD for
mentalization-based treatment and treatment of BPD more generally are discussed.
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a se-
vere condition with a lifetime prevalence that
has been estimated to be as much as 6%
(Grant et al., 2008). BPD is often comorbid
with mood and anxiety disorders, bipolar disor-
der, and schizotypal and narcissistic personality
disorder (Grant et al., 2008). It may be particu-
larly common in outpatient (Korzekwa, Dell,
Links, Thabane, & Webb, 2008) and forensic
populations (Black et al., 2007) where between
25 and 33% may be expected to meet criteria
for the diagnosis. In recent years, the develop-
mental emergence of BPD has become a topic
of significant current interest (Cohen, 2008; Ro-
gosch & Cicchetti, 2005), particularly as there is
increasing evidence that the disorder has strong
roots in early development. This paper presents
a coherent, clinically relevant developmental
model of BPD based on recently accumulated
data. We summarize the key features of the dis-
order and link these features to impairments in
specific facets of mentalization, each related to
relatively specific neural systems, and discuss
moderators of these relationships. Finally, we
outline the implications of these findings for
future research and clinical practice.
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Core Features of BPD
Although the precise nature of BPD remains elu-
sive, there is growing consensus that the core fea-
tures of the disorder consist of emotional dysreg-
ulation (e.g., Linehan, 1993; Reisch, Ebner-
Priemer, Tschacher, Bohus, & Linehan, 2008),
high levels of impulsivity (e.g., Grootens et al.,
2008), leading to self-harm and suicidality (Black,
Blum, Pfohl, & Hale, 2004), and disturbed inter-
personal functioning (Hill et al., 2008), which is
also expressed in high levels of preoccupied and
disorganized attachment patterns in BPD patients
(for a review, see Levy, Meehan, Weber, Rey-
noso, & Clarkin, 2005). In borderline patients
we and others have noted a characteristic pattern
of fearful attachment (attachment–anxiety and
relational avoidance), painful intolerance of alone-
ness, hypersensitivity to social environment, ex-
pectation of hostility from others, and greatly re-
duced positive memories of dyadic interactions
(e.g. Critchfield, Levy, Clarkin, & Kernberg,
2008; Gunderson & Lyons-Ruth, 2008).
We underscore three further facets of BPD
that emerge as aspects of disturbed social relat-
edness from both factor analytic and clinical
studies (e.g., Sanislow et al., 2002). First, disso-
ciative comorbidity is more frequently reported
by patients with BPD than other groups (e.g.
Sar, Akyuz, Kugu, Ozturk, & Ertem-Vehid,
2006; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Jager-Hyman,
Reich, & Fitzmaurice, 2008). It appears to be
a response to increased stress (Stiglmayr et al.,
2008), to be associated with emotional neglect
(Sar et al., 2006) and to be linked to suicidal
ideation (Klonsky, 2008). Second, BPD is
also characterized by a disturbed sense of iden-
tity (e.g., Blatt & Auerbach, 1988; Bradley &
Westen, 2005), rooted in a dysfunction or defi-
cit of a sense of agency or self-directedness
(e.g., Barnow, Ruge, Spitzer, & Freyberger,
2005; Bender & Skodol, 2007). Third, the ex-
perience of intense inner pain out of keeping
with the significance of the event may be a
core feature of BPD (Zanarini & Frankenburg,
2007) frequently associated with disturbed rela-
tionships (Gunderson & Lyons-Ruth, 2008),
and childhood abuse and neglect (Holm & Sev-
erinsson, 2008). It is commonly prompted by
social situations that involve rejection, aban-
donment, and/or isolation (e.g., Stiglmayr et
al., 2008), includes an intense sense of shame
(Levy, Edell, & McGlashan, 2007; Rusch
et al., 2007), and can prompt dissociation (Phil-
ipsen et al., 2004) and self-harm (Coid, 1993).
If the unequivocal description of BPD in
adulthood is problematic, its reliable descrip-
tion in adolescence is an even greater challenge
and remains controversial in terms of the
homogeneity of the category, comorbidity be-
tween and within axes, arbitrary cutoffs, and
poor test–retest reliability (Miller, Muehlen-
kamp, & Jacobson, 2008). In addition, current
dimensional models such as the five-factor
model of personality may not necessarily be
the most suitable for a detailed clinical descrip-
tion of maladaptive features of personality pa-
thology at different ages (Blatt & Luyten, in
press; De Clercq, De Fruyt, Van Leeuwen, &
Mervielde, 2006; Westen, Dutra, & Shedler,
2005), given the potentially different pheno-
typic expression of trait symptoms at younger
ages (Sharp & Romero, 2007). A classic 2-
year prospective questionnaire study (Crick,
Murray-Close, & Woods, 2005) with a repre-
sentative sample of 400 fourth to sixth graders,
for instance, found that the developmental pre-
cursors of BPD features in adolescence showed
moderate stability, although “emotion sensitiv-
ity” (intense unstable inappropriate emotion)
and “physical aggression” were no longer sig-
nificant predictors once level of depression
had been controlled for. The best predictors of
BPD features from fourth to sixth grade were in-
dicators of social dysfunction such as friend ex-
clusivity (overly close relationship with friend),
relational aggression (impulsivity), and cog-
nitive sensitivity (hostile, untrusting paranoid
world view). The adaptive functioning and psy-
chiatric symptoms of adolescents who meet cri-
teria for BPD are significantly worse than those
from clinic samples who meet criteria for other
PDs or no PD criteria (Chanen, Jovev, & Jack-
son, 2007). Specific features of BPD such as
self-harm or traits of impulsivity and affective
instability present during childhood and adoles-
cence are predictive of receiving an adult BPD
diagnosis mainly in retrospective studies (Zana-
rini et al., 2006). Both clinical and community
based studies have found only moderate stability
of the diagnosis in adolescence (Chabrol &
Leichsenring, 2006) and the stability of these
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diagnoses into adulthood is suggestive rather
than well-established (Cohen, 2008; Deschamps
& Vreugdenhil, 2008). On balance, the best evi-
dence for developmental antecedents of BPD
comes from examinations of the particular type
of social dysfunction also characteristic of the
adult form of the disorder comprising lack of
trust and relational aggression. BPD probably
consists of both stable and unstable features, ba-
sic temperamental characteristics that show sta-
bility over time, and more specific, potentially
transient symptoms that are related to these per-
sonality traits in some yet to be specified way.
BPD may consist of both symptoms that are man-
ifestations of an acute illness and symptoms that
represent more enduring aspects of the disorder,
with many patients experiencing long term dis-
ability. However, it would be too simplistic to
consider early established traits as tantamount
to inherited vulnerabilities. The interaction of un-
folding constitutional givens and the psychoso-
cial environment within which they manifest
and which they create is likely to be the leitmotif
of both this and other personality disorders.
The Mentalization-Based Approach
to BPD
It is our fundamental assumption that the core
features of BPD are not isolated characteristics,
but are related on various levels. Over the last
two decades, we have attempted to provide a
theoretically consistent way of conceptualizing
the development and interrelationship of these
features, aiming to provide clinicians with a
conceptually sound and empirically supported
approach to BPD.
Mentalization is a form of social cognition.
It is the imaginative mental activity that enables
us to perceive and interpret human behavior in
terms of intentional mental states (e.g., needs,
desires, feelings, beliefs, and goals; Allen, Fon-
agy, & Bateman, 2008; Bateman & Fonagy,
2006). Previously we have argued that impair-
ments in this capacity play an important role
in the development of various psychiatric disor-
ders that involve pathology of the self (Bateman
& Fonagy, 2004; Fonagy & Bateman, 2006b,
2008; Fonagy & Target, 2006; Luyten, Fonagy,
Mayes, & Van Houdenhove, 2009; Sharp, Fon-
agy, & Goodyer, 2008). We have consistently
argued the following:
1. Understanding the behavior of others in
terms of their likely thoughts, feelings,
wishes, and desires is a not a constitutional
given but a developmental achievement.
2. The acquisition of this capacity depends
on the quality of attachment relationships,
particularly but not exclusively, early attach-
ments, as the latter reflect the extent to which
our subjective experience was adequately
mirrored by a trusted other.
3. The quality of affect mirroring impacts on
the development of affect regulative pro-
cesses and self-control (including attention
mechanisms and effortful control) as well
as the capacity for mentalization.
4. Disruptions of early attachment and later
trauma can disrupt the capacity for mentali-
zation and, linked to this, the development
of a coherent self-structure.
5. The capacity to mentalize has both “trait”
and “state” aspects that vary in quality in re-
lation to emotional arousal and interpersonal
context.
6. Mentalization and the associated capacities for
affect representation, affect regulation, and
attentional control normally obscure forms
of subjectivity that developmentally antedate
mentalization.
7. The failure of mentalizing, in combination
with profound disorganization of self-struc-
ture, may account for the core features of
borderline personality functioning as de-
scribed above. In particular, we have argued
that borderline personality functioning can
be understood as the consequence of (a)
the loss of mentalization in emotionally in-
tense relationship contexts, (b) the reemerg-
ence at these times of modes of thinking
about subjective experience that antedate
full mentalization, and (c) the constant pres-
sure for externalization of internal states
(projective
identification), which we conceive of as the
reexternalization of disorganized intolerably
painful self-states (the self-destructive alien
self).
8. Finally, we argue that a therapeutic interven-
tion that focuses on the patient’s capacity to
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mentalize in the context of attachment rela-
tionships can be helpful in improving both be-
havioral and affective aspects of the condition.
This paper presents an expanded version of
the mentalization-based approach to BPD based
on recently accumulated data. In particular, we
reexamine the mentalization construct in the
light of current neuroimaging findings and sug-
gest a four-component developmental model
(Luyten, Fonagy, et al., 2009) that might further
increase our understanding of the relationships
among the core features of BPD from a develop-
mental perspective.
Mentalization as a Multidimensional
Construct
The concept of mentalization has been appropri-
ately criticized as a marker of a specific form of
psychopathology such as BPD because in its ori-
ginal formulation the concept was too broad and
multifaceted to be operationalized (Choi-Kain &
Gunderson, 2008; Holmes, 2005). Elsewhere
(Luyten, Fonagy, et al., 2009), based on extant
neuroimaging, developmental social and cog-
nitive research, as well as heuristic considerations,
we have proposed that mentalization can be char-
acterized as organized along four polarities: auto-
matic/controlled, cognitive/affective, internal/ex-
ternal-based, and self/other focused. Each of
these dimensions reflects the involvement of
two relatively distinct neural systems. Below we
consider the relevance of each of these polarities
to the difficulties with mentalization experienced
by patients with BPD, and describe how these dif-
ficulties are related to the core features of BPD
discussed above.
Implicit-automatic versus explicit-controlled
mentalization
The distinction between automatic and con-
trolled social cognition has existed in both so-
cial and cognitive psychology for some time,
but it has only been applied relatively recently
in the field of mentalizing (Lieberman, 2007;
Satpute & Lieberman, 2006; Uddin, Iacoboni,
Lange, & Keenan, 2007). Explicit mentaliza-
tion is typically interpreted, conscious, verbal,
and reflective. It is a serial and slow process
that requires attention, intention, awareness,
and effort. By contrast, automatic or implicit
mentalization is perceived, nonconscious, non-
verbal, and unreflective. It is typified by mirror-
ing. It presumes parallel and therefore much
faster processing, is reflexive, and requires little
effort, focused attention or intention (Satpute &
Lieberman, 2006). Developmentally, nonver-
bally determined implicit mentalizing appears
to be robust early in the second year (Onishi,
Baillargeon, & Leslie, 2007), or perhaps earlier
(Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002), whereas
verbal recognition of another’s perspective is
reliable only in the fourth (Carpendale &
Lewis, 2006). Different brain areas may be re-
cruited for automatic and controlled mentaliz-
ing. Automatic social cognition involves the
amygdala, basal ganglia, ventromedial prefron-
tal cortex (VMPFC), lateral temporal cortex,
and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
in general, phylogenetically older brain circuits
that rely heavily on sensory information. By con-
trast, controlled mentalization recruits the lateral
prefrontal cortex (LPFC), medial prefrontal cor-
tex (mPFC), lateral parietal cortex (LPAC), med-
ial parietal cortex (mPAC), medial temporal lobe
(mTL), and rostral ACC (rACC), which are phy-
logenetically newer brain circuits involved in
processing of linguistic and symbolic material.
Arousal may facilitate automatic mentaliza-
tion and inhibit neural systems associated with
controlled mentalization (Lieberman, 2007;
Mayes, 2006), and BPD patients probably have
a lower threshold for activation of flight–fight sys-
tems (Jogems-Kosterman, de Knijff, Kusters, &
van Hoof, 2007), although as we will see this
may be a more complex association than it ap-
pears (Kahl et al., 2006). Abnormal stress regula-
tion and the developmental and neurological sep-
aration of these two systems, however, may
explain how emotional arousal in BPD may on
the one hand cause the loss of explicit mentaliz-
ing yet, on the other hand patients often appear
implicitly particularly attuned to the states of
mind of individuals around them. By the same to-
ken they appear able to perform experimental
mentalizing tasks relatively well under low
arousal (Arntz, Bernstein, Oorschot, Robson, &
Schobre, 2006), but cannot explain the states of
mind they experience under high arousal and
show confusion about mental states at times
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when they are dominated by reflexive assump-
tions about the internal states of others. Unfortu-
nately, psychotherapists of many orientations
often attempt to provide mentalistic understand-
ings for issues that trigger intense emotional reac-
tions (challenging interpersonal situations, issues
of shame, guilt, feelings of inadequacy, etc.) at a
time when the capacity for effective explicit men-
talization is practically inaccessible (Fonagy &
Bateman, 2006a).
Mentalization based on internal versus
external features of self and others
Different neural networks appear to be involved
depending on whether the focus of attention for
making imaginative inferences about both our
own and others’ states of mind is internal or exter-
nal (Lieberman, 2007). A focus on “mental inte-
riors” means directly considering thoughts, feel-
ings, and experiences, and is accompanied by
the activation of a medial frontoparietal network
(Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). Focusing mentali-
zation on exteriors, on physical and visible fea-
tures, or actions of another’s or our own actions,
appears to recruit a more lateral frontotemporo-
parietal network. As the mental interior may be
thought of as a second-order representation of
the exterior (Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007),
the internal/external distinction applies as much
to self as other-related mentalization.
BPD patients primarily show deficits in
making mental state judgments when these
call for a direct focus on mental interiors.
King-Casas and colleagues (2008) asked BPD
patients to engage in a neuroeconomic social
exchange task and found that they had difficul-
ties in anticipating the likely impact of their ac-
tions on a partner player they never met before.
Results showed that they were poor at “coax-
ing” their partner (i.e., generating a good feel-
ing in them about the collaboration). By con-
trast, the weight of evidence suggests that
mentalizing tasks that focus attention on exter-
nal features cause fewer problems for these pa-
tients, and BPD patients have actually been
found to be hypersensitive to facial expressions
(e.g., Domes et al., 2008; Lynch et al., 2006).
These findings give rise to a model for the
development of affect regulation based on the
“external” versus “internal” attention distinc-
tion. We have suggested that mental interiors
are discovered by the infant through the contin-
gent interaction between external signs of affect
in the child and their processed or “metabo-
lized” or “marked” reflection by the caregiver
(Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Ger-
gely & Watson, 1996). In mirroring the infant
the caregiver must achieve more than contin-
gency (in time, space, and emotional tone).
The mirroring must be “marked” (e.g., exagger-
ated), in other words, slightly distorted, if the
infant is to understand the caregiver’s display
as part of the infant’s emotional experience
rather than an expression of hers (Fonagy et al.,
2007; Gergely, 2004). We have speculated
that the origin of affect regulation difficulties
in patients with BPD may be associated with
an early psychosocial environment where their
internal experiences were not adequately mir-
rored. Noncontingent affect expressions by the
parent will undermine the appropriate “labeling”
of the infant’s internal states (i.e., the establish-
ment of introspectively accessible second-order
representations for them) that may, in turn, re-
main confusing, experienced as unsymbolized,
and hard to regulate. One recent study has sug-
gested that individuals recruit the same neural
tissue for both mother-referential and self-re-
ferential processing, indicating a strongly inte-
grated network for the two (Vanderwal, Hunyadi,
Grupe, Connors, & Schultz, 2008), a finding
that is strikingly consistent with the suggestion
that affect mirroring plays a critical role in
self-development and development of mentaliz-
ing capacity.
Congruent with these assumptions, there is
evidence that the quality of the caregiver’s mir-
roring in the first 6 months may influence the
child’s capacity to regulate affect, as indicated
by the strange situation (Gergely, Koo´s, & Wat-
son, 2002; Koo´s & Gergely, 2001). However,
it is equally likely that temperamental character-
istics make certain infants’ affects hard to read
and their experience of affect mirroring will be
limited as a consequence. Such gene–environ-
ment effects could be one way that the known
influence of heredity (Distel et al., 2008; Lyons-
Ruth et al., 2007; Ni et al., 2007) is mediated in
BPD. It may be of particular significance that
the polymorphism that appears to mark the in-
fant’s openness to environmental influence
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(maternal sensitivity) in developing secure at-
tachment, the 5-HTTLPR short allele (Barry,
Kochanska, & Philibert, 2008), is also a marker
for vulnerability for developing borderline
and antisocial traits (Lyons-Ruth et al., 2007).
However, we have suggested that a major part
of the vulnerability that evidence suggests was
caused by early neglect (Johnson, Cohen, Chen,
Kasen, & Brook, 2006) is mediated by compro-
mise of normal affect mirroring in neglectful psy-
chosocial environments (e.g., O’Connor, 2006).
The concept of mutually responsive orientation
advanced by Kochanska (1997) seems to us the
best depiction of the qualities of the “cooperative
interpersonal set” that ultimately generate the
child’s mental interior, which in turn normally
generates self-regulation and conscience. The de-
velopmental experience of borderline children
may fall short for reasons of constitution, neglect
and emotional abuse, or an interaction of these
factors.
Cognitive versus affective mentalization
The most commonly made developmental and
neuroscientific distinction in relation to mentali-
zation is between cognitive and affective content.
Baron-Cohen, Golan, Chakrabarti, and Belmonte
(2008) identified two independent processing
systems that might normally be charged with
parsing these categories of content: (a) the theory
of mind mechanism (TOMM) mediates agent–
attitude–proposition (or M-representations) such
as “Mother–believes Johnny–took the cookies,”
and (b) the empathizing system (TESS) that uses
self-affective state-proposition (E-representa-
tions) such as “I am sorry–you feel hurt–
by what I said.” The latter are appropriately la-
beled self-affective propositions because TESS
is normally constrained always to create repre-
sentations where emotion in the other is consis-
tent with the self-affective state. Thus, it will not
create “I am pleased that you are in pain” because
it has to be a state that the self can generate in re-
lation to the presumed state in the other. This con-
straint may not be present in psychopaths (Blair,
2008). Emotion understanding and belief–desire
reasoning normally interact and only in combina-
tion generate genuine social understanding in
what we have termed mentalized affectivity or
“the feeling of feeling” (Fonagy et al., 2002).
Agent–attitude propositions are probably
subserved by several areas within the prefrontal
cortex, particularly cortical midline structures,
whereas self-affective propositions appear to
be more likely to be processed by a more auto-
matic, embodied, and lateralized system includ-
ing parts of the VMPFC (Sabbagh, 2004; Sha-
may-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Shamay-
Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Levkovitz, 2007).
The latter structure may be particularly impor-
tant as TESS and TOMM representations
come to be integrated, but it is currently not
known how these two systems might function
together to generate what we experience as em-
pathy. If there are two systems, a more basic
“emotional contagion” system associated with
the inferior prefrontal gyrus and a more advanced
cognitive perspective-taking system associated
with the prefrontal cortex as a whole (Shamay-
Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009), then
we might also expect that dysfunction in one sys-
tem might lead to overcompensation in the other.
In relation to emergent BPD, we might expect to
find an overly influential TESS system overcom-
pensating for a dysfunctional TOMM (VMPFC)
system. This might yield characteristics such as
susceptibility to emotional contagion, oversensi-
tivity to some emotional cues, a predisposition to
become overwhelmed by affect, and inability to
integrate affective knowledge with more reflec-
tive and cognitive knowledge in relation to
both other and self (Blatt, 2008). This is likely
to have a particular impact on the individual’s ca-
pacity for genuine empathy if (as is usually the
case) the actual match of attitudes between self
and other is imperfect. The constraint Baron-Co-
hen suggested for the TESS system (requiring
consistency with the self-affective state) is likely
often to lead to a state of affairs when the emo-
tional state of the self is inappropriately extended
to the other.
Mentalization with regard
to self versus others
Under this heading we are less concerned with a
dichotomy. Rather, we consider the implica-
tions of the surprising commonality between
the developmental and brain processes under-
pinning mentalization of self and other. Neuro-
imaging studies have consistently supported the
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assumption that envisioning the mind of an-
other is underpinned by the same brain systems
as identify one’s own thoughts and feelings
(Dimaggio, Lysaker, Carcione, Nicolo, & Se-
merari, 2008; Lieberman, 2007; Uddin et al.,
2007). The common circuitry used in mentaliz-
ing self and other may explain the struggle of
the normally developing child to acquire a
sense of selfhood and the self-other confusions
in disorders such as BPD, which may be asso-
ciated with the disruption of these neural sys-
tems. In BPD, the capacity to distinguish self
and other is severely impaired (e.g., Bender &
Skodol, 2007; Blatt & Auerbach, 1988; Fuchs,
2007). We have argued that “identity diffusion”
can be understood as an absence of a sense of
agency that reflects a more general failure of
mentalization, because the continuity of our
sense of self is normally ensured via our sense
of a connection between intentional mental
states and actions (Fonagy, 1991).
Reviews of the neuroimaging literature sug-
gest that two distinct neural networks are shared
by self-knowing and knowing others (Lieber-
man, 2007; Uddin et al., 2007). The first system
involves a more body-based, frontoparietal mir-
ror neuron system that is involved in under-
standing the multimodal embodied self (e.g.,
face and body recognition) and understanding
others through motor-simulation mechanisms
(Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Rizzo-
latti & Craighero, 2004). This suggests that a
fundamental process that allows us to appreciate
the actions and emotions of others involves the
activation of the mirror neuron system for actions
and the activation of visceromotor centers for the
understanding of affect. This is thought to be one
of the key evolutionary mechanisms underpin-
ning social empathy: knowing from the inside
how someone else feels. This is an implicit, au-
tomatic system, providing physical other to self
and self to other mapping, which is involved in
the immediate understanding (or misunderstand-
ing) of self and others.
The sharing of structures not only implies a
model for acquisition but also highlights the po-
tential for conflating the embodied simulation
of another person’s experience with one’s own
experience. For instance, studies have shown
that observing an action has a powerful influ-
ence on movement execution, with congruent
observation priming actions while noncorre-
sponding observation interferes with movement
execution (e.g., Kilner, Paulignan, & Blake-
more, 2003). Such conflations often appear to
occur in BPD (Allen et al., 2008). Developmen-
tally we have tended to assume a state of ego-
centrism in children; that is, that they are limited
to interpreting the world from their own point of
view (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1956). However,
motor neuron findings suggest the opposite;
that is, that infants have to develop the capacity
to learn what is “me” as distinguished from
states of mind assumed to be shared by others.
So how does the child learn to differentiate
self from others?
A second, cortical midline system that con-
sists of the mPFC, ACC, and the temporal pa-
rietal junction in the LPAC (Lieberman, 2007;
Uddin et al., 2007), appears to play a central
role in this process. This system is less bodily
based, and processes information about the
self and others in more abstract and symbolic
ways (Frith, 2007; Uddin et al., 2007). Impor-
tantly, unlike the frontoparietal system, it ap-
pears to be mainly shaped across development
by interpersonal relationships.
Recently the work of Marcel Brass and col-
leagues has offered a suggestion about how
these two apparently independent systems,
both of which process representations of both
self and other, may interact to create an experi-
ence of not-me and therefore me (Brass, Derr-
fuss, Forstmann, & von Cramon, 2005; Brass
& Haggard, 2008; Brass, Schmitt, Spengler,
& Gergely, 2007). If perceiving an intention
in another triggers the impulse to perform the
same behavior, the question of how automatic
imitation can be avoided becomes a central is-
sue. Neuroimaging studies indicate that the
neural regions that are most often recruited in
the inhibition of imitative behavior are the ante-
rior frontomedial cortex (aFMC) and the tem-
poroparietal junction (TPJ) area (Brass et al.,
2005), which are cortical areas that are also re-
lated to mentalizing, self-referential processing,
and self-agency. The TPJ is involved in per-
spective taking (e.g., Aichhorn, Perner, Kron-
bichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006), in sense
of agency (e.g., Decety & Grezes, 2006), and
mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 2006). The aFMC
is involved in mentalizing (Frith & Frith,
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2006; Gilbert et al., 2007) and self-referential
processing (Northoff et al., 2006). In fact, re-
cent work by Brass’s group, using a within-sub-
ject experimental design with reflective men-
talizing and imitation–inhibition tasks, suggests
that there is a functional relationship between
the extent an individual can inhibit imitative be-
havior and the capacity for belief–desire reason-
ing (Brass et al., 2007). Thus, it appears that the
inhibition of imitative behavior involves cortical
areas that are also related to mentalizing, self-
referential processing, and determining self-
agency. We assume that this overlap reflects
common underlying processes such as self/other
distinction and decoupling of self and other.
Hence, by reflecting on the frontoparietally
identified intent of the other, we can create a
distinction between self and other experience
and rapidly decouple the direct activation of
corresponding motor representations. The ca-
pacity to inhibit imitative behavior may be key
to enabling us to generate a sense of “me”-ness
through achieving a “not-other”-ness. In other
words, each time we interpret the actions of an-
other, there may be a sequence in which an in-
itial imitative matching response with the other
within a motor neuron self-other system inter-
acts with the reflective mentalizing self-other
system. This interaction inhibits the mirror sys-
tem and reduces the extent of “primary identifi-
cation” with the other. To anticipate later con-
siderations concerning the emergence of BPD
slightly, we might hypothesize that the failure
of medial prefrontal and temporoparietal men-
talizing function in the course of development
might leave the individual with difficulties in
decoupling their representations of another per-
son’s experience from their self-representations.
This would leave patients with BPD vulnerable
to losing a sense of self in interpersonal inter-
change because they cannot adequately inhibit
the alternative state of mind that is imposed on
them through social contagion. Perhaps, then,
the evident determination to “manipulate and
control” the mind of others that is considered
so characteristic of BPD patients can be seen
as a self-preservative defensive reaction, defend-
ing the integrity of the self within attachment
contexts. Without such control, they might feel
excessively vulnerable to losing their sense of
separateness and individuality.
In summary, as noted earlier, knowing one-
self and others are two capacities that are clearly
connected developmentally and in terms of the
brain structures subserving these processes.
This applies to both symbolic and automatic
ways of knowing. The shared ontogeny and
anatomy of these functions means that an inter-
vention that encourages self-reflection within
an interpersonal setting is well placed to modify
even deeply rooted dysfunctional processes.
The overlap in ontogeny and neural structure
points to the interpersonal origins of the self
who experiences itself and other selves as mo-
tivated by mental states: a developmental psy-
chopathology approach that has increasingly
strong empirical support (Hobson, 2002; Ro-
chat, 2009). The acute suffering that experi-
ences of separation bring for BPD patients be-
comes more understandable if we assume that
when mentalization fails the withdrawal or
physical disappearance of the attachment figure
takes on catastrophic proportions. This is be-
cause in the absence of the capacity to mental-
ize, the individual is exposed to a direct and un-
mediated experience of vulnerability to others’
reactions, now necessarily fragmented and im-
possible to differentiate from phenomenological
self-experience.
Aspects of the Phenomenology of BPD
Thus far we have suggested that the failure of
mentalization in BPD is specific to the explicit,
internal, cognitive aspects. This impairs self–
other differentiation, leaving the individual at
risk of being overwhelmed by others’ mental
states. We have identified both constitutional
and social influences that might undermine
the normal development of mentalization, par-
ticularly the absence of marked mirroring.
Does this model help us appreciate the subjec-
tive experience of individuals with BPD?
We assume that the absence of fully function-
ing mentalization is most evident through the
reemergence of prementalizing modes of repre-
senting subjectivity. The clearest of these is the
tendency to assume that mental states are direct
representations of psychical reality, normal in a
20-month-old child (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
The modes of social cognition that are charac-
teristic of the ways of thinking of BPD patients
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can be understood as prementalistic ways of so-
cial reasoning that reemerge with the disappear-
ance of controlled mentalizing. Mentalization
gives way to a kind of “psychic equivalence”
(Target & Fonagy, 1996), which clinicians often
consider under the heading of “concreteness of
thought.” What is thought is real. The hypothesis
that a situation is dangerous (“I am being victim-
ized” or “Everyone hates me”) demands extreme
measures of avoidance because experienced in
the mode of psychic equivalence, even a passing
thought feels real. No alternative perspectives are
possible. There is a suspension of the experience
of “as if.” Everything, sometimes frighteningly,
appears to be “for real.” This can add drama as
well as risk to interpersonal experience and pa-
tients’ exaggerated reactions are justified by the
seriousness with which they suddenly experience
their own and others’ thoughts and feelings. The
vividness and bizarreness of subjective experi-
ence can appear as “quasipsychotic” symptoms
(Zanarini, Gunderson, & Frankenburg, 1990),
and is reminiscent of the physically compelling
memories associated with posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD; Morrison, Frame, & Larkin,
2003). For example, women with BPD not only
report higher levels of proneness to shame and
guilt, but they also show greater shame proneness
on implicit tests of self-concepts such as the Im-
plicit Association Test (Rusch et al., 2007).
Shame is felt as “more real” by these patients
than anxious patients or normal controls, and
hence, the stronger association with self-esteem
and quality of life. The extent to which internal
experiences are experienced as if they are real
events relates to psychotic features identified in
this group that have been shown to be mediators
between histories of childhood sexual abuse and
suicidality (Soloff, Feske, & Fabio, 2008). Sim-
ilar findings are also emerging in relation to anx-
iety sensitivity in these patients (Gratz, Tull, &
Gunderson, 2008).
Evidence for the continued influence on
adults of developmentally earlier modes of
thought is available from studies of reasoning
“errors” (e.g., hindsight bias, “the curse of
knowledge,” “actions speak louder than
words”; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Blank, Nestler,
von Collani, & Fischer, 2008; Wertz & Ger-
man, 2007), which have been used to illuminate
the architecture of the belief-desire reasoning
processes. We believe that it is clinically help-
ful to view the mental functioning in BPD pa-
tients as a reemergence of developmentally ear-
lier modes of mental functioning, because it
offers us a better perspective on their experi-
ence of the world. To take just one example,
both the young child and, at times, the individ-
ual with BPD, can have an overriding sense of
certainty in relation to their subjective experi-
ence. Considering this developmentally, we as-
sume that for good evolutionary reasons (see
Csibra & Gergely, 2006) all young children
consider the things that they are taught to be
shared cultural knowledge available to all oth-
ers. The small child assumes that his knowledge
is knowledge held by all. Toddlers readily as-
sume that other children will know facts that
they themselves have just learned (Birch &
Bloom, 2003). They will therefore also assume
that there is nothing unique about their own
thoughts or feelings (Fonagy et al., 2007). De-
velopmentally, as they come to realize that not
all knowledge is shared by all, a key aspect of
theory of mind (ToM; Bloom, 2004), children
normally learn the conditions under which
this assumption should be suspended. Naı¨ve
realism (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004), the
failure to perceive one’s own biases and to see
others as more susceptible to a host of cognitive
and motivational distortions, and the “curse
of knowledge bias’” (Birch & Bloom, 2004),
thinking that if one knows something about
the world then everyone else knows it too,
stem from the same developmental source pre-
dating the emergence of the self from this sense
of “oneness.” Developmentally it is not the
overvaluing of private knowledge, but rather
the undifferentiated experience of shared
knowledge that hinders perspective taking prior
to the development of the PFC. It is social cen-
trism rather than egocentrism that remains a
challenge for the individual with BPD, because
their unusually intense mirroring representa-
tions of the other are not balanced by reflective
processes. It is important for the clinician to be
aware that it is not the overvaluing of their own
perspective that can make BPD patients adopt
an egocentric point of view; rather, their ex-
perience of their perspective feels universal.
They expect other people, including their clini-
cian, to know what they are thinking and
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feeling, and to see situations in the same way
they do. Thus, thwarting their intentions seems
malign or willfully obtuse, rather than the result
of a different point of view, alternative priorities,
and so forth. This makes such frustrations not
merely hurtful but intolerable and maddening, a
denial of what they believe to be a shared reality.
Although thoughts can feel too real for
the individual who has unreliable access to
thoughts and feelings as second order repre-
sentations, they can come to be almost dissoci-
ated to the point of near meaninglessness. The
young child creates mental models and pretend
worlds, but can maintain these only so long as
they achieve complete separateness from the
world of physical reality. Although psychic
equivalence makes subjective experience too
real, the pretend mode severs its connection
with reality and may even lead to dissociative
experiences. Dissociation, which we have
seen is sometimes a response to stress induced
loss of mentalization (Stiglmayr et al., 2008),
may be an extreme indication of such separate-
ness (Ross, 2007; Zanarini et al., 2008). In our
view, the chronic sense of emptiness that has
been found to characterize BPD is closely
linked to both dissociation and suicidal ideation
(Klonsky, 2008). In these states patients can
discuss experiences without contextualizing
them in any kind of physical or material reality.
This could explain why psychophysiological
reactivity to abandonment themes can be nor-
mal in BPD patients prone to dissociation
(Schmahl et al., 2004). Reality places fewer
limits on the creation of mental representations.
Several studies using Rorschach, the Thematic
Apperception Test, and other narrative methods
have provided evidence of hypercomplex repre-
sentations of mental states of others that are of-
ten seen as malevolent and idiosyncratically
elaborated (Stuart et al., 1990; Westen, Lu-
dolph, Lerner, Ruffins, & Wiss, 1990). There
is also neuroimaging evidence that points to hy-
peractive mentalizing (at least in terms of TPJ/
temporal parietal sulcus activation) in BPD pa-
tients in response to attachment related stimuli
(Buchheim et al., 2006). Attempting psycho-
therapy with patients who are in this mode
can lead the therapist to lengthy but inconse-
quential discussions of internal states that
have no link to genuine experience.
The teleological mode, finally, refers to a
mode of thinking that equates others’ desires
and feelings with their observable behavior.
Developmentally early modes of conceptualiz-
ing action solely in terms of that which is ap-
parent can come to dominate motivation.
Within this “teleological mode” there is a pri-
macy of the physical and observable. Experi-
ence is only felt to be valid when its conse-
quences are apparent to all. Affection, for
example, is only felt to be genuine if accom-
panied by a physical expression (e.g., a touch
or caress). For many patients with BPD, one
can only be loved if one is also physically
touched.
The most socially disruptive feature of bor-
derline cognition is the apparently unstoppable
tendency to create unacceptable experience
within the other. Externalization of the split-
off parts of a disorganized self is desirable for
the child with a disorganized attachment but
is a matter of life and death for the traumatized
individual who has internalized an abuser as
part of the self. This is evident from the extreme
levels of dysphoric affect reported by indi-
viduals with BPD, what Zanarini and col-
leagues (1998) have referred to as “the pain of
being borderline.” The unbearable emotional
experience can include feeling abandoned,
evil, betrayed, like a helpless child, misunder-
stood, mistreated, victimized, inferior, mon-
strous, and can characterize these patients’ ex-
perience on a day-to-day basis in a relatively
stable way. Patients can view themselves as per-
manently damaged, or rotten to the core (Zittel
Conklin & Westen, 2005).
The externalization of these internal states are
widely recognized in the common countertrans-
ferential reactions of therapists working with
borderline patients: anger and hatred, helpless-
ness and worthlessness, fear and worry, resent-
ment, and urges to save and rescue the patient
(Gabbard & Wilkinson, 1994). Complications
come when therapists identify with the projec-
tion and emotionally distance themselves from
individuals with BPD (Aviram, Brodsky, &
Stanley, 2006). In addition to being unusually
sensitive to rejection and abandonment, BPD pa-
tients may react negatively (e.g., by harming
themselves or withdrawing from treatment)
when they (mis)perceive such distancing and
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rejection. As Aviram et al. (2006) point out,
the stigmatizing attitude, engendered through
the externalization of an alien part of the self,
can exacerbate the behaviors in the patient
that create the stigmatizing attitude. The result
is a self-fulfilling prophecy and a cycle of stig-
matization to which both patient and therapist
contribute.
The alternative to projective identification is
obtaining relief from experiences of overwhelm-
ing and intolerable emotion through the destruc-
tion of the self in a teleological mode, that is,
physically, by self-harm and suicide (Kullgren,
1988). These and other actions can also serve
to create a terrified alien self in the other (thera-
pist, friend, parent) who thus becomes the vehi-
cle for what is emotionally unbearable. The
need for this other who “uniquely understands”
(and thereby suffers) the patient’s dysregulated
affect, not surprisingly, can become overwhelm-
ing and an adhesive, addictive pseudoattachment
to this individual may develop. Indeed, studies of
adult attachment patterns of BPD patients repeat-
edly highlight a combination of preoccupied and
unresolved attachment associated with BPD
(Agrawal, Gunderson, Holmes, & Lyons-Ruth,
2004; Fonagy et al., 1996; Nakash-Eisikovits,
Dutra, & Westen, 2002).
Moderators of Mentalization
In this section, we consider the impact of poten-
tial moderators of the robustness of mentaliza-
tion in relation to etiological factors of BPD
from a developmental perspective.
Childhood attachment environment and
the emergence of mentalization
A relation between attachment in infancy and
early social understanding was first reported
by Bretherton, Bates, Benigni, Camaioni, and
Volterra (1979), who found that children who
were securely attached at age 12 months used
more protodeclarative pointing at age 11
months than other infants. Subsequently, a
number of studies have reported associations
between the quality of children’s primary at-
tachment relationship and the passing of stan-
dard ToM tasks somewhat earlier (see Fonagy,
Gergely, & Target, 2007b; Sharp & Fonagy,
2008b). It should be noted that not all studies
have found a relationship between attachment
classification and ToM tasks, and the associa-
tion is somewhat more likely to be observed
for emotion understanding than ToM (Meins
et al., 2002; Raikes & Thompson, 2006). The
pathway connecting the two is unlikely to be
a direct one although recent evidence suggests
that the oxytocinergic system that is involved
in caregiving behavior (Bartels & Zeki, 2004;
Champagne, Diorio, Sharma, & Meaney,
2001) also enhances social awareness. Intrana-
sal oxytocin, for instance, has been found to fa-
cilitate social function, including improving so-
cial memory, memory of facial expressions and
identity, enhancing the recognition of mental
states revealed by facial expression, probably
by causing selective fixation on the eye region
when viewing faces, and increasing manifesta-
tions of trust (for a review, see Neumann,
2008). Oxytocin may link sensitivity to social
cues, such as infant facial expressions, with
dopamine-associated reinforcement pathways
(Strathearn, Fonagy, Amico, & Montague, in
press). Secure attachment and mentalization
may both be facilitated by aspects of parent-
ing. In particular, a psychological perspective
adopted by mothers in relation to their own ac-
tions or in relation to their child, including mater-
nal “mind-mindedness” and “reflective function”
as they interact with or describe their infants, is
associated with both secure attachment and men-
talization (for a review, see Sharp & Fonagy,
2008a). There is also a somewhat less well-estab-
lished association between childhood adversity,
the potential to develop disorganized attachment,
and delays and problems with mentalization
(Cicchetti, Rogosch, Maughan, Toth, & Bruce,
2003; Frodi & Smetana, 1984; Pears & Fisher,
2005; Rogosch, Cicchetti, & Aber, 1995; Smith
& Walden, 1999). Mind-mindedness is likely to
be one of those parental attributes that is most
adaptive in moderation. Although evidence on
this issue is still lacking, on the basis of clinical
observations we have proposed that maladaptive
aspects of parental mentalizing of a child can be
either deficient (concrete and stimulus bound) or
excessive or hypermentalizing (necessarily going
beyond the data, often quite distorted and some-
times paranoid; Fearon et al., 2006; Williams
et al., 2006).
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As we have already noted, retrospective eval-
uations have led to recognition that disorgani-
zation of the attachment system is a key aspect
of the psychopathology of BPD (Gunderson &
Lyons-Ruth, 2008). Moreover, two longitu-
dinal studies following children from infancy
to early adulthood have found associations be-
tween insecure attachment in early childhood
and BPD symptoms on follow-up (Lyons-
Ruth, Yellin, Melnick, & Atwood, 2005; Ro-
gosch & Cicchetti, 2005; Sroufe, Egeland,
Carlson, & Collins, 2005). There is some sug-
gestive evidence that the extent of the delay in
emotion-focused mentalization observed in
maltreated children is of developmental signif-
icance relevant to BPD. For example, the qual-
ity of understanding of the possible situational
determinants of sad and angry emotions at ap-
proximately 6 years of age was found to predict
social competence at 8 years of age, and the
experience of physical abuse was found to predict
social isolation at 8 years of age to the extent that
it had impacted on emotion understanding, even
controlling for verbal ability (Rogosch et al.,
1995). Earlier, we discussed how emotion dys-
regulation and social competence problems are
among the early precursors of borderline PD.
Yet, as many patients with BPD do not expe-
rience sexual or physical abuse (Paris, 2004),
and the majority of abuse victims will not de-
velop personality disorder (Binder, McNiel, &
Goldstone, 1996; Horwitz, Widom, McLaugh-
lin, & White, 2001), a model of BPD must be
able to accommodate these findings. In our
view, it is less the fact of maltreatment than
being in a family environment that discourages
coherent discourse concerning mental states
that is likely to predispose the child to BPD.
In line with our emphasis on the importance
of a mirroring relationship for the establishment
of mentalization, a number of studies support
the view that neglect, low parental involvement,
and emotional maltreatment rather than the pre-
sence of physical and sexual abuse are the
critical predictors of BPD (e.g. Johnson et al.,
2001; Ludolph et al., 1990). Studies that have
examined the family context of childhood
trauma in BPD tend to see the unstable, nonnur-
turing family environment as the key social me-
diator of abuse (Bradley, Jenei, & Westen,
2005) and underinvolvement the best predictor
of suicide (Johnson et al., 2002) and personality
dysfunction (Zweig-Frank & Paris, 1991). In
one small longitudinal study, early maltreat-
ment and disrupted parent–infant communica-
tion predicted BPD symptoms (Lyons-Ruth
et al., 2005), and in a larger study verbal (emo-
tional) abuse and neglect even more than phys-
ical maltreatment marked out those who went
on to develop BPD (Johnson et al., 2001,
2002, 2006). In addition, anomalies in parent-
ing and anxious attachment have been sug-
gested as possible mediating mechanisms be-
tween low socioeconomic status and BPD
symptoms (Cohen et al., 2008). Early neglect
may indeed be an underestimated risk factor
(Kantojarvi et al., 2008; Watson, Chilton, Fair-
child, & Whewell, 2006), as there is some evi-
dence from adoption and other studies to sug-
gest that early neglect interferes with emotion
understanding (e.g. Shipman, Edwards, Brown,
Swisher, & Jennings, 2005) and this plays a role
in the emergence of emotional difficulties in
preschool (Vorria et al., 2006) and even in ado-
lescence (Colvert et al., 2008). We have sug-
gested that one developmental path to impair-
ments in mentalizing in BPD is a combination
of early neglect, which might undermine the in-
fant’s developing capacity for affect regulation,
with later maltreatment or other environmental
circumstances, including adult experience of
verbal, emotional, physical and sexual abuse,
that are likely to activate the attachment system
chronically (Fonagy & Bateman, 2008, and see
further discussion below). The finding of ele-
vated PTSD scores among those 8.5-year-old
children exposed to violence who had been dis-
organized in their attachment with their mothers
at 12 months of age is also consistent with this
suggestion (MacDonald et al., 2008). There is a
marked convergence between our formulation
concerning emotional abuse and the compel-
ling proposals advanced by Linehan concern-
ing the assumption of invalidating family envi-
ronments of the young person with prodromal
BPD (Linehan, 1993).
Stress, the attachment system, and
mentalization
Full mentalizing is likely to fail to dominate be-
havior in the context of intense emotional
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arousal as the fight or flight response comes
online. Earlier formulations (e.g., Fonagy &
Bateman, 2006b) proposed that, at extreme
levels, the activation of the attachment system
is associated with a deactivation of the mentali-
zation system along with other emotion-in-
duced cognitive dysfunction. Our current for-
mulation emphasizes that in understanding the
relation between emotional arousal and mental-
izing, it is essential to go beyond a unitary con-
cept of arousal (Robbins, 1997). Key neuro-
modulators, for example, contribute to different
forms of arousal: norepinephrine contributes to
alerting, vigilance, and controlled attentional
processing in the face of stress; dopamine ener-
gizes approach behavior in response to poten-
tially rewarding incentives; and serotonin mod-
ulates arousal in the norepinephrine and
dopamine systems (Pliszka, 2003). Further-
more, the effects of arousal in any of these sys-
tems vary not only with the extent of transmitter
secretion but also with the receptor subtype ac-
tivated (Arnsten, Mathew, Ubriani, Taylor, &
Li, 1999; Mayes, 2000). Following the model
outlined by Mayes (2000, 2006) we suggest
that with increased arousal there is a switch
from cortical to subcortical systems, from con-
trolled to automatic mentalizing and subse-
quently to nonmentalizing modes (see Fig-
ure 1). Mayes (2000, 2006) proposed that
stress regulation is a differential balance of ex-
citation and inhibition involving multiple, in-
teractive neural systems with different neuro-
chemical substrates regulating specific and
different aspects of prefrontal, posterior corti-
cal, and subcortical functions.
Two points are critical for understanding im-
pairments in mentalizing in this context. First,
owing to what can be construed as this neuro-
chemical switch associated with escalating
levels of emotional stress, patterns of brain
functioning can shift from flexibility to automa-
ticity, that is, from relatively slow executive
functions mediated by the prefrontal cortex to
faster habitual and instinctual behaviors medi-
ated by posterior cortical (e.g., parietal) and
subcortical structures (e.g., amygdala, hippo-
campus, and striatum). Concomitantly, mental-
izing appears to disappear as self-protective
physical reactions (fight–flight–freeze) come
to dominate behavior. This has the presumed
evolutionary value of promoting immediate
adaptive responses to danger. In situations of
interpersonal stress, where complex cognitive–
emotional functioning (i.e., mentalizing) may
be helpful, however, the loss of mentalization
may be, to say the least, a significant incon-
venience. Thus, the degree of arousal generated
by interpersonal situations is critical. More gen-
erally, there will be situational variations when
social stress triggers the threshold for switching
from executive (mentalizing) to automatic (fight
or flight) responding. We also assume, following
Arnsten and Mayes, that the threshold for
Figure 1. A biobehavioral switch model of the relationship between stress and controlled versus automatic
mentalization (based on Luyten, Mayes, et al., 2009).
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switching can be lowered as a result of exposure
to early stress and trauma of the kind that has
been documented for BPD patients, as noted ear-
lier.
Second, both situational and more stable within-
person variations may play a role in the switch
from more controlled to automatic mentalization.
This may also be a domain where genetic as well
as developmental influences make themselves
felt. In particular, research suggests that in
BPD normal stress regulation, with a main role
for cortisol, is disturbed (see Jogems-Kosterman
et al., 2007). Functional magnetic imaging
(fMRI) studies of BPD patients that manipulated
the background level of stress and/or attachment
system activation (e.g., Minzenberg, Fan, New,
Tang, & Siever, 2007) confirm an abnormal pat-
tern of frontal deactivation and associated hyper-
responsiveness of the limbic system. For exam-
ple, Silbersweig and colleagues (2007) reported
that under conditions of negative emotion and
behavioral inhibition, BPD patients showed rela-
tively decreased ventromedial prefrontal activity
(including medial orbitofrontal and subgenual
anterior cingulated) and increased amygdalar–
ventral striatal activity correlating with decreased
constraint. Findings with implications for the hy-
pothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis function have
confirmed that BPD patients, at least those with
explicit trauma history, show a reduction in
pituitary size (Garner et al., 2007), elevated cere-
brospinal levels of corticotropin releasing hor-
mone (Lee, Geracioti, Kasckow, & Coccaro,
2005), dysfunctions of cortisol responsivity
(Jogems-Kosterman et al., 2007; Minzenberg
et al., 2006; Walter et al., 2008), and disturbed
dexamethasone suppression test response (Win-
genfeld et al., 2007).
Although these studies require further repli-
cation in the light of sometimes quite small
sample sizes, relatively disparate experimental
paradigms, and considerable heterogeneity in
sample selection (e.g., comorbidity with de-
pression, childhood abuse, PTSD, and copying
styles; Fertuck et al., 2006; Kahl et al., 2006),
research provides considerable evidence that
the activation and deactivation of the attach-
ment system is closely linked to arousal and
stress regulation (Heinrichs & Domes, 2008;
Lieberman, 2007; Mayes, 2006). Studies on ro-
dent models and neuroimaging studies have
shown that activation of the attachment system
underpinning both caregiving and partner pref-
erence is associated with the activation of two
specific systems that have consistently been
shown to play an important role in promoting
and maintaining maternal behavior: (a) the do-
paminergic reward processing system (Cham-
pagne et al., 2004; Strathearn, Li, Fonagy, &
Montague, 2008) and (b) the oxytocinergic sys-
tem (Bartels & Zeki, 2004; Champagne et al.,
2001; Levine, Zagoory-Sharon, Feldman, &
Weller, 2007). The functioning of the oxytocin
mechanism provides an obvious way of ac-
counting for the replicated association between
attachment security and the developmental ac-
quisition of mentalization competencies. Vaso-
pressin may play an analogous role, perhaps es-
pecially in males (Caldwell, Lee, Macbeth, &
Young, 2008; Lim et al., 2004).
Based on these findings, there are good rea-
sons to suppose that different attachment histories
are associated with attachment styles that differ in
terms of the associated background level of acti-
vation of the attachment system, and the point at
which the switch from more prefrontal controlled
to more automatic mentalizing occurs (Luyten,
Fonagy, et al., 2009). In particular, neuroimaging
studies support the notion that attachment history
affects the setting of the “switch,” which turns
the mentalizing system from planned, controlled
and organized cognition to automatic processing
with narrowed, poorly sustained attention, and in-
creased vigilance for attachment disruptions such
as rejection and abandonment.
For example, Gillath, Bunge, Shaver, Wen-
delken, and Mikulincer (2005) reported an
fMRI study of women with high and low scores
on attachment anxiety and avoidance who were
asked to think about or stop thinking about
various relationship scenarios. When thinking
about negative scenarios, women with high
levels of attachment anxiety showed more acti-
vation in the hippocampus (memory retrieval)
and in emotion-related brain regions (the ante-
rior temporal pole and the dorsal anterior cingu-
late), and less activation in the orbitofrontal cor-
tex. It seems that in contemplating negative
scenarios those with an anxious attachment style
may underrecruit the brain areas associated with
emotion regulation and show enhanced retrieval
of negative memories. In a prospective study,
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Strathearn and colleagues (2008, in press) exam-
ined whether differences in attachment security
of 30 first-time mothers assessed using the
Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George,
Kaplan, & Main, 1985) before the birth of their
child, were related to brain reward and pe-
ripheral oxytocin response to infant cues.
Mothers about 10 months after birth of their
child viewed their own or others’ infants’ smil-
ing and crying faces during fMRI scanning.
Mothers with secure attachment showed greater
activation of brain reward regions, including the
ventral striatum, and the oxytocin-associated
hypothalamus/pituitary region. Peripheral oxy-
tocin response during infant contact was also
significantly higher in secure mothers, and the
size of change from baseline oxytocin levels
was positively correlated with brain activation
to own infants in both regions. The important
differences based on attachment history
emerged when the mothers viewed their in-
fants’ sad faces. Securely attached mothers con-
tinued to show greater activation in reward pro-
cessing regions, whereas insecure/dismissing
mothers, congruent with findings described
earlier, showed reward system deactivation
and insular activation in response to seeing their
own infant’s sad faces. The insula may be a re-
gion associated with feelings of unfairness,
pain, and disgust (see review by Montague &
Lohrenz, 2007). Mothers with insecure/dismiss-
ing attachment histories appeared less able to
downregulate the sad feelings evoked in them
by their infant’s sad faces, possibly because
they felt overwhelmed by sad memories of their
own past. These findings suggest that for se-
curely attached mothers, infant cues (whether
positive or negative in affect) may act as an
important affective signal of “incentive salience”
(Berridge, 2007), reinforcing and motivating re-
sponsive maternal care. However, insecure
mothers may experience a negative subjective re-
action that would make them reflect (mirror)
their infant’s sadness without being able to create
a symbolic/mentalizing distance between their
infant’s and their own states of mind.1
The finding of reduced “reward” activation
in mothers with insecure/dismissing attachment
is also consistent with a recent study of re-
sponses to smiling adult faces and positive
task feedback (Vrticka, Andersson, Grandjean,
Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2008). This study re-
ported a negative correlation between dismiss-
ing attachment scores and activation of the ven-
tral striatum. This is certainly congruent with
the typical distant and detached relational style
of avoidant individuals, and their tendency to
deny the importance of attachment relation-
ships. In both studies, challenges to the attach-
ment system yielded greater ventral striatal
activation in securely attached individuals,
whereas in avoidant/dismissing individuals it
was associated with a relative downregulation
of reward-related activity. Consistent with the
claims above about the complementary activa-
tion of the attachment and mentalizing systems,
in the Vrticka et al. study, avoidant attachment
was positively related to activation in the mPFC
and the ventral (vACC), areas that have been
implicated in controlled social cognition and
mentalization, social rejection, and emotion
suppression. Moreover, Vrticka and colleagues
also reported that secure attachment was posi-
tively related to the activation of the ventral
striatum in response to positive reinforcement,
but negatively with activation of the amygdala
to negative reinforcement. This is in line with
previous suggestions we have made that secure
attachment requires the simultaneous (paradox-
ical) activation of components that are normally
reciprocally activated, mentalizing and reward-
salience associated regions of the brain (Fonagy
& Bateman, 2006b). These observations are
also congruent with the assumption that secure
attachment consists of a combination of low
anxiety and low avoidance.
Based on these and other findings, we pro-
pose that a combination of characteristics
strongly associated with attachment history
is likely to determine whether an individual
“switches” in a particular context from more
controlled reflective to automatic mentalization
(see Figure 1, and for a detailed discussion, see
Luyten, Fonagy, et al., 2009).
1. The phenomenon of insecure mothers experiencing and
therefore perhaps directly mirroring their infant rather
than in a “marked” (nearly, but clearly not the same)
manner may be one of the mechanisms behind the inter-
generational transmission of patterns of attachment (van
IJzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1997).
Understanding and treatment of borderline personality disorder 1369
The studies reviewed suggest that the anx-
ious–preoccupied attachment strategies that
are characteristic of many BPD patients are as-
sociated with a lowered threshold for attach-
ment system activation and, simultaneously, a
lower threshold for controlled mentalization de-
activation (see Figure 2). Thus, more automatic,
subcortical systems, including the amygdala,
have a low threshold for responding to stress
in BPD patients. This hypothesis in and of itself
could offer a comprehensive explanation for
one of the central dynamic features of BPD pa-
tients, that is, their tendency to form attach-
ments easily and quickly, often resulting in
many disappointments. This pattern would be
because of their low threshold for activation
of the attachment system, and their low thresh-
old for deactivation of neural systems associ-
ated with controlled social cognition, including
neural systems involved in judging the trust-
worthiness of others. The vicious interper-
sonal cycles that are so characteristic of many
BPD patients thus can be understood in
terms of excitatory feedback loops leading to
increased vigilance for stress-related cues in anx-
ious attachment, particularly attachment charac-
terized by high anxiety and high avoidance
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). These vicious cy-
cles are also related to their hypervigilance con-
cerning emotional states in others and their fail-
ure to deactivate a hyperactive TESS system,
which further feeds into their lack of self-other
differentiation, setting up a likely sequence of
further failures in understanding their own inter-
nal world, that of others, and the relationship be-
tween the two (see Figure 2).
We assume that the arousal of the attachment
system, beyond more general interpersonal
stress induced arousal, leads to a general loss
of mentalization. Any trauma arouses the at-
tachment system (seeking for protection) and
attachment trauma may do so chronically. In
seeking proximity to the traumatizing attach-
ment figure as a consequence of trauma, the
child may naturally be further traumatized.
The prolonged activation of the attachment sys-
tem may be an additional problem, because the
arousal of attachment may have specific inhib-
itory consequences for mentalization in addi-
tion to that which might be expected as a conse-
quence of increased emotional arousal. In BPD
it is therefore possible not only that trauma-
related rapid triggering of fright–flight may ac-
count for the inhibition of mentalization, but
more specifically that the hyperactivation of
the attachment system in BPD may be a conse-
quence of maltreatment specifically in an at-
tachment context. Attachment theorists, in par-
ticular Mary Main and Erik Hesse, have
suggested that maltreatment leads to the disor-
ganization of the child’s attachment to the care-
giver because of the irresolvable internal con-
flict created by the need for reassurance from
the very person who also (by association per-
haps) generates an experience of lack of safety.
The activation of the attachment system by the
threat of maltreatment is followed by proximity
seeking, which drives the child closer to an ex-
perience of threat leading to further (hyper)acti-
vation of the attachment system (Hesse, 2008).
This irresolvable conflict leaves the child
with an overwhelming sense of helplessness
and hopelessness, and leads to what has been
considered a hyperactivation of the attachment
system. There can be no resolution of the
anxiety, because looking for reassurance and
protection generates more fear through the
(mental) proximity of the maltreating figure.
The ready triggering of the attachment system
in BPD may be a residue of trauma history
and manifests both as the rapidly accelerated
tempo of intimacy in interpersonal relations
and vulnerability to the temporary loss of
mentalization.
In contrast, in individuals with secure at-
tachment, the activation of the attachment sys-
tem predictably involves a relaxation of normal
strategies of interpersonal caution. Congruent
with this assumption, expressions in most lan-
guages associate love with various severe forms
of sensory handicap, particularly blindness.
There is good evidence that intense activation
of the neurobehavioral system underpinning at-
tachment is associated with deactivation of
arousal and affect regulation systems (Luyten,
Mayes, et al., 2009), as well as deactivation of
neurocognitive systems likely to generate inter-
personal suspicion, that is, those involved in
social cognition or mentalization, including
the LPFC, mPFC, LPAC, mPAC, mTL, and
rACC (Bartels & Zeki, 2000, 2004; Lieberman,
2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). Moreover,
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Figure 2. A mentalization-based model of BPD.
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the neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin
play key roles in two aspects of creating attach-
ment relationships: (a) by activating the reward/
attachment system (the “push” mechanism in-
volved in attachment), and (b) by deactivating
neurobehavioral systems that are involved in
mediating social avoidance (the “pull” mecha-
nism involved in attachment). For instance,
oxytocin and vasopressin have been shown to
inhibit aversion of both female and male ro-
dents to infant pups, as well as leading to a
number of affiliative behaviors, including care-
giving behavior (Insel & Young, 2001). Oxyto-
cin also reduces behavioral and neuroendocrine
responses to social stress and seems both to en-
able animals to overcome their natural avoid-
ance of proximity and to inhibit defensive be-
havior, thereby facilitating approach behavior.
Vasopressin has primarily been implicated in
male-typical social behaviors, including ag-
gression and pair-bond formation, and mediates
anxiogenic effects (Heinrichs & Domes, 2008).
Thus, in the context of secure attachment, the
activation of the attachment system will gener-
ate increased experience of reward, increased
sensitivity, decreased social avoidance, but
also the potential for the reward to override
lack of trust.
This complex set of associations with social
behavior may help us to account for the puz-
zling combination of facilitative and inhibitory
associations between attachment history and
social cognition. In two separate imaging stud-
ies, Bartels and Zeki (2000, 2004), for instance,
reported that the activation of areas mediating
maternal and/or romantic attachments appeared
simultaneously to suppress brain activity in
several regions mediating different aspects of
cognitive control and including those associ-
ated with making social judgments and mental-
izing. The medial prefrontal, inferior parietal,
and medial temporal cortices mainly in the right
hemisphere, as well as the posterior cingulate
cortex, may be part of the circuitry specialized
for attention and long-term memory (Cabeza
& Nyberg, 2000), perhaps specifically respon-
sible for integrating emotion and cognition
(e.g., emotional encoding of episodic memo-
ries; Maddock, 1999) and subserving mood-
mediated inhibition or enhancement of cog-
nitive processing (Mayberg et al., 1999). The
second set of brain areas observed to be deacti-
vated by the activation of attachment concerns,
included the temporal poles, parietotemporal
junction, amygdala, and mesial prefrontal cortex,
areas consistently linked to explicit and internally
focused mentalization including judgments of
social trustworthiness, moral judgments, ToM
tasks, and attention to one’s own emotions.
Individuals who use attachment deactiva-
tion strategies, typical of dismissive attached
individuals, are able to keep the neural systems
involved in controlled mentalization “on-line”
for longer, including neural systems involved
in judging the trustworthiness of other indi-
viduals (i.e., the “pull mechanism” associated
with attachment; Vrticka et al., 2008). The dis-
tinction from securely attached individuals is
clear. Secure individuals are able to keep the
controlled mentalizing system “on line” even
in the context of increased stress, which is
less likely to trigger the attachment system,
whereas dismissive individuals, for whom
mild stress is not likely to trigger the attachment
system, may be able to keep mentalization
going until the stress becomes severe, at which
point the deactivating strategy is likely to fail. If
securely attached individuals are those who are
able to retain a relatively high activation of pre-
frontal areas in the presence of the activation of
the dopaminergic mesolimbic pathways (attach-
ment and reward system), then differences in
mentalization between securely attached and
avoidantly/dismissively attached individuals may
only show themselves under increasing stress,
and this seems concordant with experimental
studies (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Although
the threshold of avoidant individuals for switching
from controlled to automatic mentalization might
be elevated, studies have shown that under in-
creasing levels of stress, these deactivating strate-
gies tend to fail, leading to a strong reactivation
of feelings of insecurity, heightened reactivation
of negative self-representations, and increased
stress (Mikulincer, Gillath, & Shaver, 2002).
By contrast, a low threshold for the stress-in-
duced activation of the attachment system may
translate as easy deactivation of the “pull-
mechanism” of attachment, and a low threshold
for activation of the “push-mechanism.” In ad-
dition, we hypothesize that, if all other factors
are constant, the greater an individual’s use of
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hyperactivating strategies, the lower will be
their threshold for the activation of automatic
mentalization and thus the stronger the relation-
ship between stress and a switch to automatic
mentalization will be (see Figure 2; Luyten,
Fonagy, et al., 2009). Moreover, we predict
that greater use of hyperactivating strategies
will also be associated with increased time to
recovery of mentalization and that deactivating
strategies might be associated with relatively
rapid recovery of the capacity for mentalization
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), but these predic-
tions remain to be investigated.
However, this model would explain why
mentalization deficits in BPD are more likely
to be observed when the attachment system is
triggered, such as in studies collecting AAI nar-
ratives (e.g., Fonagy et al., 1996), and why BPD
patients who mix deactivating and hyperacti-
vating strategies, as is characteristic of disorga-
nized attachment, show a tendency for both
hypermentalization and a failure of mentaliza-
tion. Because attachment deactivating strategies
are typically associated with minimizing and
avoiding affective contents, BPD patients often
have a tendency for hypermentalization, that is,
continuing attempts to mentalize, but without
integrating cognition and affect. At the same
time, as the use of hyperactivating strategies is
associated with a decoupling of controlled men-
talization, this leads to failures of mentalization
as a result of an overreliance on models of so-
cial cognition that antedate full mentalizing
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). Similar conclu-
sions have been drawn from an fMRI study in
BPD patients where TAT cards elicited hyper-
activation of the anterior cingulate and medial
prefrontal cortices, suggesting an overly sensi-
tive switch between emotionally salient and
neutral information processing (Schnell, Die-
trich, Schnitker, Daumann, & Herpertz, 2007).
Finally, it is important to note that BPD is in
some ways at the opposite end of the spectrum
from interpersonal resilience (Gunderson &
Lyons-Ruth, 2008; Higgitt & Fonagy, 1992)
and understanding the association between re-
silience and mentalization (Fonagy & Target,
1997) also provides helpful insight into BPD.
Studies suggest that the ability to continue to
mentalize even under considerable stress leads
to so-called “broaden and build” (Fredrickson,
2001) cycles of attachment security, which re-
inforce feelings of secure attachment, personal
agency, and affect regulation (“build”), and
lead one to be pulled into different and more
adaptive environments (“broaden”; Mikulincer
& Shaver, 2007). Congruent with these as-
sumptions, studies on resilience have shown
that positive attachment experiences are related
to resilience in part through relationship recruit-
ing, that is, the capacity of resilient individuals
to become attached to caring others (Hauser,
Allen, & Golden, 2006). Hence, high levels of
mentalization and the associated use of se-
curity-based attachment strategies when faced
with stress are good candidates to explain the ef-
fect of relationship recruiting and resilience in
the face of stress. Attachment hyperactivation
and deactivation strategies, typically employed
by anxious–preoccupied and dismissively at-
tached individuals respectively, in contrast,
have been shown to limit the ability to “broaden
and build” in the face of stress. Moreover, they
have also been shown to inhibit other behavioral
systems that are involved in resilience, such as
exploration, affiliation, and caregiving (Insel &
Young, 2001; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Neu-
mann, 2008), which might also partially explain
these individuals’ difficulties in entering lasting
relationships (including relationships with men-
tal health care professionals) and the intergenera-
tional transmission of psychopathology.
One major implication of these findings is
that treatment should aim to find the optimal
balance between attachment activation and
mentalization (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006b).
Moreover, this implies that treatments that fo-
cus on gaining insight into one’s past, and
particularly into one’s traumatic past, which
typically involves high levels of stress, might
be contraindicated in patients with serious im-
pairments in mentalization. As trauma is typi-
cally associated with attachment insecurity,
and anxious and disorganized attachment in
particular, insight-oriented treatments might
be especially harmful for this subgroup of
BPD patients (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006a).
For instance, studies have shown that reflecting
on oneself and one’s autobiographical past and
self-concept, capacities that are typically called
upon in many forms of insight-oriented psycho-
therapy, are associated with activation of the
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mPFC, which is deactivated under increasing
arousal levels (Lieberman, 2007).
Relationship-specific mentalization:
Mentalization in context
The association between mentalization, stress,
and attachment reviewed in the previous section
suggests that we should expect differences in
the quality of mentalization depending on the
quality of the relationship within which the as-
pect of interpersonal cognition is observed (Al-
len et al., 2008; Luyten, Fonagy, et al., 2009).
This means that some revision of previously
held assumptions is called for. Attachment the-
ory and research is largely based on the as-
sumption that cognitive–affective models of re-
lationships (internal working models Bowlby,
1980) are relatively stable over time and are ac-
tivated in a wide array of interpersonal relation-
ships, including relationships with parents,
partners, and friends (Fraley, 2007; Overall,
Fletcher, & Friesen, 2003). Similarly, mentali-
zation has often been assumed to be invariant
across different relationships. For instance, cur-
rent assessment methods of mentalization, such
as the Reflective Functioning Scale as scored
on the AAI (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele,
1998), Child Attachment Interview (Ensink,
2003), and Parent Development Interview (Slade,
2005), involve the aggregation of mentalization
across a number of attachment relationships.
Moreover, because the Reflective Functioning
Scale involves scoring mentalization based on
states of mind with regard to past attachment
experiences, research with this scale makes
the further assumption that mentalization elic-
ited in relation to past relationships will be re-
lated to current and even future relationships (Fo-
nagy, Steele, Moran, Steele, & Higgitt, 1991).
However, research has called into question
the assumption that working models are trait-
like. The substantial within-person variation
in internal working models of others (e.g., fa-
ther vs. mother) (e.g., Fraley, 2007; Pierce &
Lydon, 2001) supports a view of internal work-
ing models as hierarchically organized net-
works that contain both global and relation-
ship-specific representations (Fonagy, 2001;
Overall et al., 2003) or as distributed processes
within a connectionistic network (Fraley, 2007).
As mentalization is likely to be a function
loosely coupled with the attachment system
(Fonagy & Target, 1997), it is doubtful that in-
dividual differences in mentalization are best
thought of as essentially traitlike. Mentalization
is likely to show considerable fluctuations over
time and across relationship contexts, not just as
a function of stress but also as a function of the
quality of particular relationships. Several sets
of empirical observations are relevant to this as-
sumption. First, general and relationship-spe-
cific mentalization, although overlapping, ap-
pear to be distinct (Happe´ & Frith, 1996;
Humfress, O’Connor, Slaughter, Target, & Fo-
nagy, 2002; O’Connor & Hirsch, 1999), and
there is increasing agreement that key mentali-
zation-linked experiences associated with so-
cial relationships, such as trust and fairness,
are relationship-specific (Bugental & Johnston,
2000; Fiddick & Cummins, 2007). Second,
several independent research traditions have fo-
cused on mentalization with regard to one’s
own infant as a relationship-specific form of
mentalization (for a review, see Sharp & Fon-
agy, 2008a). Third, and most pertinent in the
present context, is the line of evidence suggest-
ing that quality of mentalization of therapists
may be specific to particular patients and,
even within that, may be variable across ses-
sions of psychotherapy (Diamond, Stovall-
McClough, Clarkin, & Levy, 2003; Diamond
& Yeomans, 2008; Vermote et al., 2009).
These findings are congruent with neuro-
imaging studies suggesting an inverse relation-
ship between amygdala activation and the acti-
vation of mentalizing areas (particularly mPFC
and TPJ) in response to pictures or names of
more or less familiar and personally connected
individuals (Bartels & Zeki, 2000, 2004; Gob-
bini & Haxby, 2007; Gobbini, Leibenluft, San-
tiago, & Haxby, 2004; Ortigue, Bianchi-Demi-
cheli, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2007). In line with
these and the above observations concerning
the situation and relationship specificity of
mentalization, we suggest that any anomalies
in relation to mentalization are unlikely to be
manifest in patients with BPD unless the rela-
tionship in which mentalization is being ob-
served “pulls” for the activation of these areas.
The stronger the attachment in a particular rela-
tionship at a particular moment, the more likely
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that anomalies in mentalization will emerge in
these patients. Certainly, clinical evidence
strongly implies that as the attachment bond be-
tween therapist and client intensifies, the qual-
ity of BPD patients’ mentalization will tend to
deteriorate. Thus, initial assessment of clients
can leave therapists with the impression that
they are working with an individual with rela-
tively high psychological mindedness and some-
one highly suitable for insight oriented psycho-
therapy. Typically, as treatment progresses and
transference intensifies, activating the patient’s
internal working models of particular child–par-
ent relationships and their attachment system in
general, the quality of psychological mindedness
is likely to deteriorate significantly and the pa-
tient’s capacity to perceive the therapist’s mind
as different from his or her own mental state
will be quite limited at times (Allen et al., 2008).
The perspective we are taking also implies that
in both research and clinical practice, assessment
of mentalization of patients with BPD will be po-
tentially unhelpful without regard to context, or
based on specific categories of relationships. In-
terviews such as the AAI and the recently de-
veloped Child Attachment Interview (Shmueli-
Goetz, Target, Fonagy, & Datta, 2008), as well
as the Object Relations Inventory (Diamond,
Blatt, Stayner, & Kaslow, 1991) allow scoring
for mentalization with regard to self and others,
as well as mentalization in specific relationships,
as they elicit narratives about different significant
others, and therefore provide a promising avenue
for further research in this area.
Conclusions
Although there is increasing consensus regard-
ing the core features of BPD, there is much dis-
agreement over the features that should take pre-
dominance in explaining the etiopathogenesis of
BPD. In this paper we suggest that the core fea-
tures of BPD reflect impairments in different
facets of mentalization, each related to impair-
ments in relatively distinct neural circuits under-
lying these facets. Hence, we aim to provide a
comprehensive account of the core features of
BPD at multiple levels of analysis by showing
how these core features are related with each
other in theoretically meaningful ways. More
specifically, we argue that BPD is associated
with low thresholds for activation of the attach-
ment system under stress, which, in combination
with low thresholds for deactivation of the ca-
pacity for controlled mentalization, particularly
with regard to differences in mental states of
self versus others, renders the interpersonal
world incomprehensible and leads to a cascade
of impairments in other types of mentalization.
This theory offers a framework for understand-
ing BPD patients’ propensity to become in-
volved in vicious interpersonal cycles, their
marked affective dysregulation, and high levels
of impulsivity, as well as identity diffusion, dis-
sociative experiences, and profound feelings of
inner pain. Our formulations translate into a co-
herent treatment approach, which may also in-
form treatment of BPD across various theoretical
orientations.
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